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Abstract
Background: Collaborative collection and sharing of data have become a core element of biomedical research.
Typical applications are multi-site registries which collect sensitive person-related data prospectively, often together
with biospecimens. To secure these sensitive data, national and international data protection laws and regulations
demand the separation of identifying data from biomedical data and to introduce pseudonyms. Neither the
formulation in laws and regulations nor existing pseudonymization concepts, however, are precise enough to
directly provide an implementation guideline. We therefore describe core requirements as well as implementation
options for registries and study databases with sensitive biomedical data.
Methods: We first analyze existing concepts and compile a set of fundamental requirements for pseudonymized
data management. Then we derive a system architecture that fulfills these requirements. Next, we provide a
comprehensive overview and a comparison of different technical options for an implementation. Finally, we
develop a generic software solution for managing pseudonymized data and show its feasibility by describing
how we have used it to realize two research networks.
Results: We have found that pseudonymization models are highly heterogeneous, already on a conceptual level.
We have compiled a set of requirements from different pseudonymization schemes. We propose an architecture
and present an overview of technical options. Based on a selection of technical elements, we suggest a generic
solution. It supports the multi-site collection and management of biomedical data. Security measures are multi-tier
pseudonymity and physical separation of data over independent backend servers. Integrated views are provided by
a web-based user interface. Our approach has been successfully used to implement a national and an international
rare disease network.
Conclusions: We were able to identify a set of core requirements out of several pseudonymization models. Considering
various implementation options, we realized a generic solution which was implemented and deployed in research
networks. Still, further conceptual work on pseudonymity is needed. Specifically, it remains unclear how exactly data is
to be separated into distributed subsets. Moreover, a thorough risk and threat analysis is needed.
Keywords: Electronic data capture, Security, Privacy, Confidentiality, Pseudonymization, Web-based application,
Seamless integration, Mashup, Cross-domain communication
* Correspondence: ronald.lautenschlaeger@tum.de
Chair for Biomedical Informatics, Department of Medicine, Technical
University of Munich (TUM), Grillparzerstraße 18, 81675 Munich, Germany
© 2015 Lautenschläger et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Lautenschläger et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2015) 15:100 
DOI 10.1186/s12911-015-0222-y
Background
While collaborative research is developing rapidly, (e.g.
[1–4]) a series of publications has shown relevant privacy
threats [5], especially when genomic data are involved
[6, 7]. On the other side, security of research data and
biosamples is being addressed by regulations. The most
important are the European Directive on Data Protection
[8] (which is currently undergoing a reform process [9]),
the European Recommendation on Research on Biological
Materials of Human Origin [10] and the HIPAA Privacy
Rule [11].
On the technical and organizational level, state-of-the-
art security measures are needed to protect sensitive
research data from unauthorized access. Important
techniques include the use of secure network communica-
tion, strong authentication mechanisms, role-based access
and different access tiers.
Definitions and scope
Pseudonymization adds an important layer of protection
for person-related data. It has been implemented in many
projects (e.g. by the UK Biobank [12], the Icelandic biobank
run by deCode Genetics [13] and the German National Co-
hort [14]) and it has become an important security measure
required by laws and regulations. The term “separation”
plays a central role in various definitions and regulations.
The formulation in the Proposal for a General Data Protec-
tion Regulation of the Council of the European Union [9]
is: “personal data may be processed for […] scientific re-
search purposes only if […] data enabling the attribution of
information to an identified or identifiable data subject is
kept separately from the other information”, and in the
German Federal Data Protection Act [15]: “characteristics
enabling information concerning personal or material cir-
cumstances to be attributed to an identified or identifiable
individual shall be stored separately”, and in the Italian
Personal data protection code: “identification data shall be
stored separately from all other data“[16]. There are, how-
ever, different definitions of pseudonymity and even syno-
nyms for the term itself (including “coding” and “aliasing”
[15, 17]). For the purpose of this work, we will use the term
pseudonymity according to the description by Kalra et al.
(who in turn cite a definition by Lowrance [17]) [18]:
“Pseudonymization (reversible anonymization, or key
coding) involves separating personally identifying data
from substantive data but maintaining a link between
them through an arbitrary code (the key).”
The ISO Technical Specification 25237 on “Health in-
formatics - Pseudonymization” also addresses separation:
“identifying and payload data shall be separated” [19].
While separation is a common element in the cited
sources, there is no explicit specification of what exactly
has to be separated. It is clear that separation will require
at least two data pools. Kalra uses the term “identifying”
data to characterize the first one, while the above reg-
ulations describe this first part as “data enabling the
attribution […] to an identified or identifiable data
subject”. In slight difference to Kalra, ISO 25237 uses
the terms “identifying”, “quasi-identifying” or “indirectly
identifying” [19]. We will refer to identifying data as
master data. For the content of the second pool, Kalra
uses “substantive data”, the regulations call it “other
data”, and ISO uses the term “payload”. It is particu-
larly unclear which attributes should (or can) remain in
this second pool. Both ISO 25237 and Pommerening
et al. [20] have addressed but not completely clarified
this. Pommerening et al. [20] have introduced additional
types of data: 1) identifying data, 2) medical- or clinical
phenotype data, 3) data associated with the management
of biospecimens, and 4) data resulting from the analysis of
biospecimens. We will not further address the specifica-
tions of different types of data [19, 20], and consider data
pools to be pre-defined. We recommend, however, clarifi-
cation by further work. Our focus will be on separation
and on the management of pseudonyms. We will address
pseudonymous identifiers for biosamples, but we will not
go into any detail of biosample management itself.
Some further clarifications are necessary. While an-
onymous data are not considered personal data in a
regulatory sense, pseudonymous data remain personal
data [9]. There is a distinction between irreversible
and reversible pseudonymity: within this article, we
will focus on the latter case. As separation of data is a
core characteristic of pseudonymization, we illustrate
it by Fig. 1, showing two different options.
Option 1, which we call “one-tier pseudonymized” has
been used in trials for decades, the “two-tier pseudony-
mized” approach is more recent and it is recommended
by ISO 25237 [19] and by Pommerening et al. [20].
Using the terminology from ISO 25237, we will consider
A, B, C “identifying” and D, E, F as “payload”. Two-tier
pseudonymity means that the datasets are interlinked via
a set of cascading identifiers. When two-tier pseudony-
mization is used, each component maintains its own
namespace for identifiers. The identifiers from different
namespaces are linked by a dedicated mapping service.
The figure also shows the “integrated dataset” that can be
constructed by de-pseudonymizing the dataset. We will
refer to this simplified data-centric view of Fig. 1 through-
out this paper.
It is important to distinguish between concepts and
their implementation. A pseudonymization concept de-
scribes a more or less abstract separation of data into
different pools, potentially combined with specifications of
valid data flows and implementation constraints. Already
on the concept level, there are different approaches to
pseudonymization. In this article, we will focus on two
models: the ISO Technical Specification 25237 [19] on
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“Health informatics - Pseudonymization”, which describes
concepts fundamental to pseudonymity in biomedical
research environments, and the German model by
Pommerening et al. [20], which is closely related to
ISO 25237. Overviews of the concept by Pommerening
et al. [20] can be found in [21–23]. The solutions de-
scribed by Brinkmann et al. [24], Spitzer et al. [25],
and Lablans et al. [26] are also based on the German
model, and therefore these references contain short
descriptions of the model.
Objectives
Motivated by the need to design and implement IT solu-
tions for several research projects [27–29], we had (1) to
collect and systematize core requirements for secure solu-
tions, (2) to compare implementation options, and (3) to
implement a generic solution. The focus of our work is on
multi-site research registries with sensitive biomedical
data; the management of biosamples had to be addressed
by the solution, but will only be shortly touched in this
article.
Methods
In order to get a conceptual basis, we have started our
work with an analysis of two comprehensive concepts
([19, 20]). While ISO [19] is international by its definition,
[20] is being considered a set of quasi-standard require-
ments in Germany. From these two sources, we compiled
a set of fundamental requirements for pseudonymized
data management. Functional requirements were taken
from related work on electronic data capturing systems
and complemented with results from our own analyses
which we cannot describe in detail here. The next step
was to design a system architecture fulfilling these require-
ments. For this purpose, we analyzed several architectural
options. Then, we created an overview of technical options
for an implementation and performed a comparison. The
final step has been the implementation of a generic solu-
tion. Its feasibility has been demonstrated in research net-
works of which we will shortly describe two ([27, 29]).
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and data protection of-
ficers of the participating sites have approved the concept.
For a comprehensive list we refer to Additional file 1.
Results
The methodical approach described above has led to re-
sults which we will present in the same order: (1) core
requirements, (2) an analysis of architectural options, (3)
a high-level system architecture, (4) an analysis of tech-
nical options, (5) a technical design and (6) several
implementations.
Requirements analysis
When implementing an electronic data collection system,
the permission model for access to data has to be designed
carefully, e.g. following the need-to-know principle as well
as the principle of least privilege. Audit trails are essential
in any case. Context-dependent rights and roles of users
are an important factor: who (in which role) has the right
and the need to know which data in which context. In
general, a health care professional treating a patient may
need more permissions than a researcher. We will not
follow up on these aspects, because they are not directly
related to the problem of pseudonymization.
Instead, we will focus on functional requirements between
the system and its users that are affected by introducing
pseudonymity and non-functional requirements that are im-
plied by pseudonymization concepts. We note that this
classification is in-line with the according concepts in soft-
ware engineering: non-functional requirements may be de-
fined as “not directly concerned with the specific services
delivered by the system to its users” [30].
Functional requirements
Our solution focusses on a clearly defined use case: col-
laborative prospective electronic collection of longitu-
dinal person-related data. The key stakeholders are users
and patients. Users are health care professionals, study
nurses, registry monitors and researches. Functional
requirements have been compiled from related work
Fig. 1 Examples for pseudonymizing datasets with data-layer separation. The example dataset consists of two attributes (Attr1 and Attr2) that are
separated from each other. The first attribute can be considered identifying, whereas the second attribute contains payload data. The dataset
contains three data entries
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by Demiroglu et al. [31], Bialke et al. [32], Meyer et al.
[33] and Spitzer et al. [25] and from a comprehensive
overview by Ohmann et al. [34]. We complemented
them by results from our own software engineering
process, which we cannot describe in full detail here
(see Kalman et al. [27] and Kohlmayer et al. [35] for a
short overview). While links to biosamples play an im-
portant role in many systems (e.g. [27, 31, 35–37]), we
will not cover this aspect in detail.
For our overview of functional requirements, we intro-
duce a systematic order and focus on the subset of specific
relevance to our topic. Where appropriate, we motivate
functional system requirements with usage scenarios. The
following set has resulted from our approach:
 R-C1 - Data Collection: The system shall support
the collection of research data and metadata about
associated entities in electronic forms or documents
(eCRFs) [33–35].
 R-C2 - Data Structuring: Typically, different types
of data are collected in different eCRFs that belong
to the same context (e.g. patient or visit). The system
shall provide means to maintain links between
associated entities and documents. [38]
 R-C3 –Integrated View: The system shall support
integrated views on different forms or documents
between which an association exists [27, 32, 33].
 R-C4 - Data Management: The system shall
provide methods for validation of data completeness
and integrity [32, 34, 35].
We note that requirements R-C1, R-C2, R-C3 and RC-
4 need a legal basis and must be covered by informed
consent. We further note that R-C3 may include an inte-
grated view of master data and other types of data. This
view should adhere to the need to know principle and
must be compliant with legal and regulatory requirements.
A usage scenario for R-C3 is the process of re-contacting a
patient or proband in cases specified by patient informa-
tion and informed consent. R-C3 is also of relevance for
follow-up data collection where (additional) information
about a patient or proband needs to be entered during
multiple visits. For this purpose, documents also need to
be integrated with master data [27, 33, 35]. Finally, some
processes of data management may also require an inte-
grated view on several documents, for example, for cross
validation [19].
Non-functional requirements
Patients have an inherent interest in security and confi-
dentiality of the data they have consented to share. At
the same time, data management solutions for collab-
orative biomedical research has to be compliant with
national and international laws. As outlined above, two
pseudonymization concepts [19, 20] have been our basis
for formulating non-functional requirements. We will
present a set of non-functional requirements, which define
a system that is able to fulfill the functional requirements
while ensuring compliance with pseudonymization con-
cepts. Were appropriate, we will motivate non-functional
requirements with references to functional requirements
and requirements implied by these concepts. To describe
the central aspect of “separation”, we start by focusing
on the data layer. Typically, information systems are
described by further layers, comprising an application
and a presentation layer [39], which support (and to
some degree model) real-world processes [40]. We will
structure non-functional requirements along these layers.
Requirements on the data layer
On the data layer, the concepts [19, 20] define pseudonymi-
zation of a dataset as a separation into subsets containing
different types of data. The records within these subsets are
stored in different locations and they are interlinked with
identifiers. Data collection and management can be mod-
eled as a set of CRUD operations on documents: (1) Create:
creates a new document, (2) Read: provides a view of the
data contained in one document or a list of other docu-
ments related to one document. (3) Update: provides a view
of the data contained in a document while allowing updat-
ing its content. (4) Delete: deletes a document.
 R-D1 - Distributed CRUD: The system shall
implement data collection on top of a set of distributed
databases.
 R-D2 - Physical separation: The system shall
support the hosting of different backends on different
physical machines with different host names.
 R-D3 - Two-tier pseudonymization: The system
shall provide support for two-tier pseudonymization,
implemented with an additional mapping service.
As a result of R-D1, operations on documents must be
performed across different data pools. Requirement R-D2
is motivated by the fact that [19, 20] require the installation
of separate governance, duties and responsibilities for the
individual data pools. Requirement R-D3 is motivated by
our aim to provide a generic solution for both pseudonymi-
zation concepts [19, 20] which require two-tier pseudonym-
ity in several cases (e.g. when biosamples are involved and/
or in multi-site research networks).
Requirements on the application layer
As the application layer supports workflows that are pro-
vided to users, requirements on this layer are strongly
influenced by the above functional requirements:
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 R-A1 – De-Pseudonymization: The system shall
support the de-pseudonymization of data.
On the documentation level, and thus on the system
level, re-identification requires reversing the separation
between identifying data and payload data [20, 31, 35].
De-pseudonymization, which equals a re-identification
of data subjects, is a core element related to (reversible)
pseudonymity. On the real-world level, re-identification
means revealing the hidden identity of a subject. The
non-functional requirement R-A1 is implied by functional
requirement R-C3. The latter is motivated by several usage
scenarios, for which a legal basis exists. We have summa-
rized them above and they are described in detail in ISO
25237 [19].
Pommerening et al. have added the following require-
ments on application-layer:
 R-A2 - Client-side re-combination: The
reconstruction of the logical global dataset shall
only be performed at the client-side to reduce the
number of attack vectors [20].
 R-A3 - Confidentiality of internal identifiers:
Clients shall be unable to learn the pseudonymous
identifiers used in the distributed databases [20].
Requirements on the presentation layer
 R-P1 - Usability: The system should adhere to
well-established usability guidelines [34, 41].
This requirement (R-P1) is motivated by the fact that
there are reports on systems in which the linkage of differ-
ent data subsets must be performed manually, i.e., by copy-
ing and pasting an identifier displayed by the interface of
one application into the interface of another application
[26]. This process is time-consuming and error-prone [42].
Furthermore, implementing a consistent user interface for
several distributed systems while ensuring a continuous
workflow means that there should be no need for users to
separately authenticate on the multiple systems involved.
Requirements on all layers
Data separation will inevitably lead to complex architec-
tures which may negatively affect maintainability. We have
therefore added the following requirement:
 R-M1 - Maintainability: The system should allow
for centralized installation and maintenance [33, 35].
This requirement is quite typical for multi-site scenar-
ios: the integration of a system module into the security
architectures of (distant) clinical or research sites implies
challenges such as managing institutional firewalls and
software installation policies. Frequently, the system
needs to support a large set of users that are distributed
geographically.
Analysis of architectural options
Next, we have analyzed options to build an integrated
interface to distributed databases. The architectural de-
sign space is shown in Fig. 2. In the remainder of this
section we focus on applications built with web tech-
nologies. We note, however, that the presented system
architectures are applicable to other development tech-
niques as well.
Loose coupling
The concept of loose coupling illustrates a thin layer
implementing presentation-layer integration. In this case,
users need to sequentially access different clients for sep-
arate systems, which might be displayed next to each other
or be embedded into each other. Moreover, methods for
context management, such as HL7 CCOW [43], may be
used. Loose coupling does only support limited exchange
of data between interfaces (interface-to-interface commu-
nication). Operations like creating, updating and deleting
documents have to be performed manually, potentially re-
peatedly on the interfaces of the multiple systems over
which the data of an entity is distributed. To maintain
consistency, identifiers must often be transferred manually
from one system to another. Obviously, this represents an
error-prone and inefficient workflow, which may lead
to data quality issues. Furthermore, using the system is
Fig. 2 Design space for distributed data management. A loosely coupled architecture only provides little integration. A tightly coupled
architecture integrates the interfaces from several backends. In single-page applications, the user interface is delivered by exactly one backend
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complicated, as different modules may utilize different
user interface designs and different interaction patterns,
which may negatively affect user acceptance. Most papers
describing implementations of pseudonymization concepts
are based on the principle of loose coupling [26, 31, 32, 36,
37, 44, 45].
Tight coupling
A design with tight coupling, which is also shown in Fig. 2,
allows for integrated access to several endpoints. Here, each
endpoint provides its own graphical user interface but a
dedicated component (called the primary service) delivers
the main application and provides presentation-layer inte-
gration of user interfaces. Moreover, endpoints may provide
additional programming interfaces for access to data. These
access points may be used by the central component to en-
able interface-to-interface communication, resulting in a
seamless user experience. In contrast to loosely coupled de-
signs, the central component needs to process and display
data from different domains. Moreover, business logic is
more complex because access and interaction between the
separated services must be orchestrated.
Single-page application
In contrast to tight coupling, a Single-page Application
(SPA), which is also sketched in Fig. 2, does not imple-
ment any form of presentation-layer integration but only
uses a single graphical interface provided by one endpoint
together with further interfaces for accessing data from
the other endpoints. As a consequence, the backends only
need to implement very little business logic. Access to
backends is, e.g., provided via a Web Application Program-
ming Interface (Web API). Typical examples include Rep-
resentational State Transfer (REST) interfaces or Web
Services (WS) using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) or
Extensible Markup Language (XML) as a syntax for mes-
sage exchange. Such applications can be implemented with
client-side Model-View-Whatever (MVW) frameworks, such
as, AngularJS [46] or Backbone.js [47].
Architectural design
Based on the requirements described above and the
architectural options identified, we designed a high-level
system architecture. To reduce installation efforts and
ensure compatibility with enterprise security architec-
tures, we decided to implement a web-based system that
adheres to established web standards and is thus access-
ible from a broad spectrum of web browsers. Moreover,
distributing updated versions of our software becomes
easy (R-M1).
On an architectural level, we decided against a loosely
coupled design due to the problems described above. For
a Single-Page Application the technologies supported by
legacy web browsers are insufficient. Frameworks for SPAs
are partially immature and not in widespread use. Hence,
we decided for a tightly coupled architecture that guaran-
tees seamless integration (R-A1) and good usability (R-P1)
based on reliable and widely supported technologies.
The requirement that it must only be possible to re-
construct the dataset at the client side (R-A2) is fulfilled
by employing client-side mashup-techniques. In short, a
client-side mashup displays data from different servers
in an integrated manner within a user’s local browser.
To support multi-tier pseudonymity (R-D3), we maintain
a mapping service, which translates pseudonymous identi-
fiers from the namespace of one system into the namespace
of another. It is ensured that the distributed datasets can
only be joined at the client systems by exclusively delivering
data to clients, meaning that no data is (directly) exchanged
between backend services. In this process it is further en-
sured that clients cannot learn pseudonymous identifiers
(R-A3) by substituting identifiers within the distributed
datasets with temporary identifiers before delivering any
data. To allow for a re-combination of separated data
subsets these temporary identifiers must be synchro-
nized between the backend services. To this end, a se-
cure server-to-server communication channel is needed
that is not accessible by clients. To ensure consistency
while supporting common types of database operations
(R-D1), data is managed in a set of distributed relational
database management systems (RDBMSs).
Two problem-specific challenges arise from the design
decisions described above. Firstly, to ensure continuous
workflow, a Single-Sign-On (SSO) mechanism has to be
implemented (R-P1). Secondly, in all modern browsers,
the implementation of client-side mashups of data re-
trieved from different domains is complicated by the
Same-Origin-Policy (SOP). The basic principle of the
SOP is that “only the site that stores information in the
browser may later read or modify that information” [48].
This security feature prohibits cross-domain communica-
tion, which, on the other hand, is required to re-integrate
distributed data subsets that must be hosted on different
physical machines in our setup (R-D2).
Analysis of technical options
In order to proceed from a high-level architecture towards
an implementation, a variety of implementation options
for different aspects of the architecture exists and has to
be discussed. In this section, we will present and compare
several options for implementing the most important
modules of the system: (1) client-side web mashups, (2)
single-sign-on mechanisms, and, (3) methods for provid-
ing a secure server-to-server communication channel.
Web mashups
In [49] a mashup is defined as “a website […] that seam-
lessly combines content from more than one source into
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an integrated experience”. In the context of our work,
implementing a Web Mashup is challenging, because
data is stored in different physical locations and thus
accessed via different interfaces provided by servers from
different fully qualified domain names. Integrating such
distributed interfaces and data conflicts with the Same-
Origin Policy (SOP), a security feature which prohibits
cross-domain communication. It was designed to protect
a user’s privacy by preventing sites from tracking a user’s
behavior, e.g., by reading stored cookies or data from the
cache. The SOP also prevents a user’s actions from being
corrupted by other websites and it prevents websites
from performing transactions on behalf of the user [49].
The SOP is implemented by only allowing scripts to
modify a web page of the same origin only (i.e., loaded
by the browser from the same domain). The work by De
Ryck et al. presents an overview of state-of-the-art
mashup techniques [50]. Well-known techniques that
can be used to realize mashups include HTML Frames,
PostMessage, XMLHttpRequest (XHR) and JSON with
Padding (JSONP) [50]. However, not all of these tech-
niques provide means to circumvent the restrictions
implied by the SOP.
HTML frames
An HTML-frameset is a group of HTML-frames. The
content of a frame is dynamically loaded and independ-
ent of the other frames in a frameset. IFrames (inline
frames) were introduced in HTML 4.0. In contrast to
standard HMTL-frames, IFrames allow for embedding
HTML-documents in the body of other HTML docu-
ments. HTML-Framesets and IFrames can be used to dis-
play contents from different domains in a browser but
without supporting any kind of interaction. Enforcing the
SOP, the contents of each origin will be loaded separately
and isolated from the contents of other frames.
PostMessage
The HTML postMessage mechanism enables cross-domain
communication by enabling scripts to send messages to
HTML Frames or windows of arbitrary origin. This feature,
available since HTML 5, relies on the recipient to verify
that the message is from a valid or authorized sender [51].
It is not supported by legacy browsers.
XMLHttpRequest (XHR)
XHR is a widely supported API in web browsers that al-
lows sending HTTP requests to a server which returns
XML-, TEXT/HTML- or JSON-formatted data. It is
accessed with web scripting languages, most commonly
JavaScript. XHR does not support cross-domain commu-
nication unless the client supports Cross-Origin Resource
Sharing (CORS), which is a W3C recommendation since
early 2014 and is therefore not supported by legacy
browsers.
JSON with Padding (JSONP)
JSONP is a communication technique that exploits the
fact that the SOP is not applied to the src-attribute of an
HTML script tag. Here, a script tag is created in which
the endpoint from which data is to be received is defined
as the src-attribute. To make the data available to the
local scripting context, the endpoint embeds the re-
quested data into a call to a local JavaScript function.
Which function is to be called with the requested data is
encoded into the Query String of the endpoint’s URL.
The name JSONP stems from the fact that data is typic-
ally encoded in JSON format and can thus be directly
transformed into JavaScript objects.
Server-side mashups
A server-side mashup can be implemented by employing
a proxy that integrates data from different sites into a
common context and delivers it to the clients. A proxy
can also be used to mask different origins of data and
thus circumvent the SOP [49]. In our context, server-
side mashups cannot be used. A proxy must be able to
see all the information that it has to integrate. On the
other hand, sensitive personal data managed by research
systems must only be transported via encrypted channels
(typically using Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL)).
Additionally, this encrypted channel must be established
between the client and the data stores, because of the
requirement to restrict the context of data linkage to
the local machines of users.
Single-sign-on
A web mashup must be combined with a Single-Sign-
On mechanism that ensures a continuous workflow by
making it unnecessary for users to separately authenti-
cate on the multiple systems involved. In addition, a
complex system for collaborative research also requires
means for authorization. The same design decisions that
must be made for authentication must also be made for
authorization: (1) should the according mechanism be
implemented by a dedicated component within the dis-
tributed system (e.g. using Shibboleth for authentication),
or (2) should each component handle the according aspect
by itself. In this section we provide an overview of these
design dimensions and present several techniques that can
be used to implement the various aspects involved.
Non-delegated authentication
In this setup, each component handles authentication by
itself. The most straight-forward implementation simply
includes the user’s credentials (user name and password)
in all requests to an endpoint. When, as in our case,
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servers are stateful, a server-side session must addition-
ally be associated with the client. Sessions are usually
identified by a randomly generated token and these IDs
can (and will) thus be different for different sessions at
different servers. As a result, the client must either ac-
tively manage a set of session IDs, one for each server,
within its business logic or use a passive approach, such
as cookies.
Cookies
While not directly related to authentication and
authorization, cookies are a widespread technique to
make user sessions persistent across several requests
to an endpoint. Here, the unique session ID is stored
in a local file (called cookie), which is transparently
transferred to the host on every request. Because the
Same-Origin-Policy also applies to cookies (a single
cookie cannot be sent to multiple endpoints hosted on
different domains), this mechanism cannot be used to
implement cross-domain Single-Sign-On. However,
cookies can complement SSO solutions, because they
can be used to persist individual sessions at different
endpoints.
Server-to-server communication
Single-Sign-On can also be implemented with server-to-
server communication. Here, opening a session at one
endpoint transparently creates sessions on the other
endpoints as well by implementing a communication
mechanism between servers. As a result, it (a) can be en-
sured that a single user session is identified by the same
token on different endpoints, and, (b) there is no need
to send the user’s credentials to the endpoints with every
request. This technique can be implemented, e.g., with a
multicast protocol such as JGroups [52], sockets or a
shared file system. Such an approach is difficult to inte-
grate into Enterprise Security Architectures.
Access tokens
Typically, SSO solutions are implemented with crypto-
graphic access tokens. Basically, a token is an object that
encapsulates the identity and potentially roles of a user
as well as a session ID. Tokens generated by one system
can be used to perform operations on another system. A
token can (and must) be validated by the target system.
From a conceptual perspective, using access tokens is not
different from the server-to-server communication ap-
proach. The only difference is that with the former ap-
proach server-to-server communication is indirect, i.e.,
performed via the client. This makes this approach feasible
for implementing SSO between several isolated services
on the World Wide Web. Consequently, the approach is,
e.g., implemented by Kerberos [53] and Shibboleth [54].
Access tokens provide a secure communication channel
between servers, meaning that the client cannot read or
modify the content of a token. This is especially useful in
our scenario, because it can be used to fulfil an additional
non-functional requirement. When implementing access
tokens, the main challenges are (1) transferring tokens
from the clients to the server, and, (2) key management.
Rights and roles
The handling of authorization of a user’s actions is typic-
ally coupled with authentication. As a consequence,
the design space is closely related to the design space
for Single-Sign-On solutions. Role-based access control
(RBAC) is an authorization mechanism in which rights
are granted to users depending on their associated roles.
A role encapsulates a set of permissions. Analogously to
SSO, RBAC can be realized with a) a centralized compo-
nent that authorizes users as well as b) a decentralized solu-
tion where every system implements a RBAC component
and manages authorization by itself. Important standards
for authorization in distributed environments include
SAML and XACML [55].
Secure server-to-server communication
For synchronizing temporary pseudonyms between back-
end services, secure communication channels are needed.
In this context, secure means that the contents of messages
are hidden from the clients. This can be implemented with
two different mechanisms. Firstly, backend servers can
manage exclusive communication channels between them
and use these to synchronize information about temporary
pseudonyms. Secondly, a secure channel between servers
can be built that is routed through the client by using
cryptographic tokens.
Direct communication
Figure 3a shows how the reconstruction of a pseudony-
mized dataset using temporary identifiers can be per-
formed with direct server-to-server communication. In
step 1, the client requests a data item (A) from backend
B1. The backend creates a temporary pseudonym for the
data entry and persists its association to the actual iden-
tifier from its namespace (step 2). The data entry with
substituted identifier is then delivered to the client (step
3). Next, the client requests the data item associated
with the temporary identifier (step 4) from backend B2.
In step 5, the backend requests a mapping of the tem-
porary identifier from backend B1. B1 resolves this re-
quest by looking into its set of persisted temporary
mappings (step 6). The answer to B2 must be routed
through the mapping service (steps 7 and 8). Finally, in
step 9, B2 delivers the data entry to the client. Problems
with this approach include that (a) it is unclear when
exactly the persisted substitution of an identifier may be
deleted without implementing complex protocols for
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transactional guarantees, and, (b) at least seven messages
must be exchanged to recombine data distributed amongst
two databases via mapping service.
Indirect communication
Figure 3b shows the reconstruction of a pseudonymized
dataset with indirect server-to-server communication.
Analogously to the previous example, the client requests
a data item from backend B1 (step 1). In step 2, the
backend creates an association with a temporary identi-
fier, replaces the actual identifier for the data item and
sends it back to the client. In contrast to the previous
scenario, where the mapping from the actual identifier
to the temporary pseudonym is persisted, B1 also sends
an encrypted token containing the association. The client
forwards the token to the mapping service (step 3) where
it is decrypted and the ID from backend B1 is translated
in the associated ID at backend B2. Next, the mapping ser-
vice generates a second token for B2, containing the map-
ping from the temporary pseudonym to the original
identifier. This token is sent to the client (step 4) where it
is forwarded to backend B2 (step 5). Finally, in step 6, B2
decrypts the token, performs a lookup for the data item
and sends the result back to the client, along with the tem-
porary pseudonym. At the client side, the data from both
backends can be joined using the temporary identifier. We
note that in this simple example, it would be sufficient to
keep track of the relationships between requests and re-
sponses to perform a mapping of the contained data. In
more complex real-world scenarios, however, tokens may
contain multiple data entities. As a consequence, tokens
must contain identifiers that allow combining individual
data items from different backends. The use of temporary
identifiers for this purpose is motivated by R-A3, which
requires internal identifiers to be kept confidential.
Compared to direct server-to-server communication, the
number of exchanged messages is reduced. Fewer com-
munication channels must be managed, because the same
communication channels are used for client-to-server and
server-to-server communication. Moreover, as already
noted above, indirect server-to-server communication can
also be implemented relatively easily, if access tokens are
already used for implementing Single-Sign-On. In the
remainder of this section, we will elaborate on ways to
implement cryptographic (access) tokens.
Transferring tokens
While tokens can easily be sent from servers to clients
in our context, sending tokens from clients to servers is
more challenging. Tokens can be embedded into three
different segments of an HTTP request: (1) HTTP request
line (URL), (2) HTTP header fields, (3) HTTP message
body. These techniques have different properties in terms
of compatibility to legacy browsers, implementation com-
plexity and compatibility with other techniques required
to implement pseudonymized data management, espe-
cially JSONP. Here, all parameters must be encoded into a
request URL, because, by specification, requests embedded
into src-attributes are executed as HTTP GET-Requests
by browsers. The only approach that ensures backwards
compatibility and that is compatible with JSONP is
embedding tokens into the HTTP request line via URL
ID-1 Attr1 ID-1 ID-2 Attr2ID-2 ID-1 Attr1 ID-1 ID-2 Attr2ID-2
Fig. 3 Two basic methods for joining distributed data with temporary identifiers and a mapping service. When using direct communication,
backend servers synchronize temporary identifiers directly with each other. When using indirect communication, messages are exchanged via
the client only. This communication pattern is less complex and servers remain stateless
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Rewriting. An additional challenge when implementing
this method is to overcome a length restriction that is
enforced to URLs by most browsers (e.g., 2083 charac-
ters per URL in Internet Explorer). This can be solved
by implementing packet fragmentation mechanisms,
i.e., splitting a request into multiple sub-requests at
the client-side, which are recombined into one request
at the server-side [56]. Tokens can also be embedded
into the header of HTTP GET- and POST-Requests but
this method can only be realized with JavaScript calls and
is thus not compatible with JSONP. Finally, tokens can be
embedded into the HTTP Body of POST-Requests. Again,
this is not compatible with JSONP, because JSONP re-
quires GET-Requests to be performed.
Key management
To maintain confidentiality for the contents of a token,
symmetric or asymmetric (or hybrid) cryptography can
be employed. Depending on the topology of the infra-
structure (hierarchical or peer-to-peer), encryption also
affects key management. In a hierarchical infrastructure,
a single component can be employed to manage all keys
needed for the encryption of tokens, whereas in a peer-
to-peer infrastructure each component needs to manage
key pairs for every other component. In web-based ap-
plications, tokens can be implemented with JSON Web
Tokens (JWT) utilizing related technologies such as JSON
Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signatures (JWS) and
JSON Web Keys (JWK) [57].
Technical design
Based on requirements, we selected a set of technical
options for an implementation. In this section, we will
describe the resulting generic solution.
The maintainability requirement (R-M1) was weighted
high in our implementation. Our aim was to develop a
solution that is robust while only relying on technologies
supported by common web browsers (including wide-
spread legacy browsers). We therefore decided to build a
client-side Web Mashup with HTML Frames for parts
of the application that do not require any interface-to-
interface communication and with utilization of JSONP
for all other cases. In our implementation, data is mod-
eled as a tree-like structure where the root represents a
subject’s master data and further nodes represent doc-
uments containing payload data. To support data col-
lection, as defined by R-C1, we realized interfaces for
CRUD operations on this tree with two functional
views: “create, list & delete” and “view & update”. The
former provides a list of documents and allows creating
new or deleting existing documents. The latter shows the
content of a document and allows updating it. Several in-
stances of these two types of views may be displayed next
to each other, thus providing an integrated interface as
required by R-A1 to fulfill our functional requirements R-
C2, R-C3 and R-C4. JSONP is a good solution for inter-
faces in which data of many entities has to be displayed,
i.e. the “create, list & delete” view. In the other cases, i.e.
the “view & update” interface, we leverage HTML Frames
because of their ease of implementation and therefore in-
creased productivity when developing the software.
For Single-Sign-On (see R-P1) our solution implements
non-delegated authentication where each component han-
dles authentication and authorization autonomously. This
design decision is driven by the fact that many pseudony-
mization schemes require at least one trusted third party
(TTP), which is organizationally and physically separated
from the rest of the system. As a result, decentralized au-
thentication and authorization is performed for each re-
quest and each component provides its own administrative
interface and RBAC model. Keys are distributed in a peer-
to-peer topology. Non-delegated authentication is im-
plemented with cryptographic access tokens that also
provide a secure communication channel between servers
that is routed via the client. Tokens are created by back-
end servers. At the client side, they are always appended
to the URL. When using JSONP this is implemented with
JavaScript, otherwise a server-side URL rewriting mechan-
ism is used. Session-IDs are persisted with cookies. As de-
fined in requirement R-D3, our solution supports two-tier
pseudonymization. This makes joining distributed data
more complex, because pseudonyms need to be translated
from one namespace into another namespace. Moreover,
requirement R-A2 specifies that this linkage must only be
performed at the clients. We use the same token infra-
structure for SSO and for implementing an indirect com-
munication channel between backend servers (cf. Section
“Secure Server-To-Server Communication” and Fig. 3b).
There are multiple frameworks for implementing token
infrastructures, but we decided to develop our own solu-
tion that is tailored to our requirements for the following
reasons. JSON Web Tokens are still in a draft-phase and
currently immature. XACML and SAML come with a
significant overhead regarding the size of the exchanged
messages because they use an XML-Syntax. This is prob-
lematic when transmitting data via URLs. Furthermore,
XACML and SAML are complex, resulting in a rather
high implementation effort. In our system, tokens are
encrypted with a hybrid method combining AES and RSA.
The payload is encrypted symmetrically and integrity
protected and the key for decryption K1 is encrypted
asymmetrically with the public key K2 of the receiver.
Tokens contain the key K1, username, password, counter
and payload data P (e.g. encoded in JSON syntax). In the
following Ex(y) denotes the encryption and integrity
protection of y using the key x. The token is built of
two components. The first component contains the key
K1, which is encrypted and integrity protected with the
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public key of the Server (K2), i.e. EK2(K1). The second
component contains the username, password, counter
and the payload encrypted and integrity protected with
the key K1 from the first component, i.e. EK1(username,
password, counter, P). Replay protection is implemented
with a counter that is continuously incremented and
prevents repeated acceptance of tokens by any receiver.
The design of our solution supports two or more phys-
ically distributed data stores (R-D2) and one or more map-
ping services (R-D3). All endpoints have to provide API
access and all services but the mapping service must be
able to provide HTML-formatted data to clients as well.
However, the mapping service must provide HTML-
Frames that embed HTML-formatted data from other ser-
vices, as will be explained below. A basic design fulfilling
all requirements of the model by Pommerening et al. [20]
must implement separation of master data and clinical
data [15]. A minimal solution is shown in Fig. 4. The cen-
tral component is implemented by the backend managing
master data (primary service), because it stores the root
nodes of the tree and is thus the starting point for user
interactions.
Our final solution combines the above techniques into
a Web-Mashup that integrates pseudonymized data (R-A2).
The first variant, which uses HTML-Framesets, is sketched
in Fig. 5. Here, a static frame at the top displays selected
data of a single entity from the primary service. The
content of the second frame, which is located at the
bottom, is provided by the mapping service and contains
an additional nested frame, which shows the correspond-
ing clinical data. Please note that in Fig. 5 pseudonyms are
represented as clear text instead of being encoded into to-
kens for the sake of readability. In our implementation
pseudonyms are encoded into encrypted tokens and there-
fore never visible to the client (R-A3).
A typical workflow in which the above method is uti-
lized is the creation of a new eCRF. Firstly, the user logs
into the primary service and selects a specific subject. The
primary service returns a HTML-Frameset as response,
where the top-frame contains an HTML-document with
the master data of the selected subject. A new instance of
a predefined eCRF is generated and the resulting docu-
ment is displayed using the previously described method.
In this process, a chain of HTTP-Requests is generated, in
which the user’s credentials are encoded into tokens and
distributed to all endpoints to implement SSO.
A basic version of this process is shown in Fig. 6. To
simplify our illustration, we assume that the first request,
which also logs the user into the system, already con-
tains the ID of the subject for which a new document is
to be created. In a real-world scenario, the login process
would already have been performed earlier. It can be
seen that the user’s credentials and the ID of the data
element that is to be displayed are sent to the primary
service with the first request. From there on, the operation
to be performed, on which data it is to be performed and
for which user, is encoded into tokens. These tokens are
generated at the backends. This also provides a transpar-
ent SSO mechanism. As an alternative to embedding
nested frames, this process can also be implemented by
using an HTTP-Redirect to route the request from the
mapping service to the secondary service.
Fig. 4 System architecture for a tightly coupled system with
pseudonymization. The example shows the separation and two-tier
pseudonymization of two data subsets. The data subsets as well as
the mappings between pseudonymous identifiers are managed by










Primary service Mapping service Secondary service
Fig. 5 Presentation-layer integration of pseudonymized data with
nested HTML Frames. In this mockup, interfaces provided by different
backends are integrated by rendering them into nested HTML Frames.
This enables the integration of a mapping service and thus the
transparent resolution of pseudo-nymized relationships
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The second variant of our Web-Mashup uses JSONP
requests to display distributed pseudonymized data. It is
especially suitable for scenarios in which a larger set of
distributed but related entities, e.g., a list of all subjects
and an overview of associated clinical data, is to be dis-
played. The method is sketched in Fig. 7.
First, a HTML-document is delivered to the client by
the primary service, e.g. containing the master data of
multiple subjects as well as a set of temporary pseudonyms
of related data items for each subject. Via JavaScript code,
the client then performs a set of AJAX requests to the
mapping service in order to translate the pseudonyms
from the primary service’s namespace to the namespace
of the secondary service. These requests contain a map-
ping of the actual pseudonyms of the primary service
and the temporary pseudonyms. The mapping service
associates the temporary pseudonyms with the pseudonyms
of the secondary service and returns the mapping to the
client. Next, the client requests the data items identified
by those pseudonyms from the secondary service. Finally,
the temporary pseudonyms in the HTML-document are
replaced with the actual data items from the secondary
service and the content of the HTML document is up-
dated dynamically. The basic information flow is very
similar to the one which is depicted for the method imple-
mented with HTML Frames in Fig. 6. The only difference
is that the primary service and mapping service only re-
turn tokens, which are then passed to the next receiver,
thus implementing the previously described communica-
tion channel that is routed via the client.
Implementations
We have used the described generic solution as a basis
for implementing the data management software for several
research projects [27–29]. We will focus on two of them
[27, 29] which are research networks for rare diseases.
Here, the primary actors are health care professionals in an
observational study. No specific intervention takes place,
and data used for research are collected during health care
activities. The associated biobanks use prepared “kits”
Client Primary Mapping Secondary








Fig. 6 Information flow between services when using HTML Frames. When cascadingly accessing backends, all relevant information is encoded
into tokens that are transferred between the hosts via the client. In addition, backends return HTML pages that contain parts of the final frameset.
To simplify our illustration, we ignore the fact that the client addresses entities with identifiers from different namespaces than the backends
Fig. 7 Presentation-layer integration of pseudonymized data with JSONP. First, a HTML document is requested from the primary service, which
contains the master data of multiple subjects as well as a set of pseudonyms of related data items for each subject. Via AJAX requests, the
pseudonyms are translated to the namespace of the secondary service. Then, the according data is requested, again via AJAX, and the content of
the document is updated. To simplify our illustration, we ignore the fact that entities are addressed with identifiers from different namespaces
and that the identifiers of entities are encoded into tokens
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(tubes with identifiers sent to sites and returned to a
central biobank) with pseudonymous labels, which are
registered in the system. Internal second level pseudo-
nyms are provided as required by [19, 20]. We will not
address the management of biosamples here.
Our first system instance is “mitoRegister”, a multi-site
registry which is a part of the mitoNET project [29].
This research network for mitochondrial disorders was
started in 2009 under funding by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). It serves as a
platform for over 18 centers in Germany and by August
2015 about 1165 patients have been recruited. Data is man-
aged by 35 eCRFs, which comprise over 900 attributes.
Our second system instance also supports a research
network for neurodegenerative diseases, TIRCON [27].
This project was started in 2012, funded by European
Commission FP7-Health Work Programme [58]. Our
software supports TIRCON’s registry for 13 partners
from 8 countries (including the US, UK and Germany).
By August 2015 about 265 patients have been recruited.
Data is collected in 34 eCRFs consisting of almost 1000
attributes. TIRCON comprises further system parts [27].
In both projects three separated and two-tier pseudony-
mized data pools are managed by our solution: a) master
data, b) clinical phenotype data and c) biospecimen regis-
tration data.
Our solution was implemented with Java-Server-Faces
as the driving technology for the backends, jQuery for
client-side functionalities, MySQL as a database system
as well as Tomcat application servers and Apache web
servers as runtime environments. Both systems use two-
factor authentication with One-Time-Passwords (OTP)
following the OATH standard [59] for user accounts
with high privileges. Users are provided with time-based
dongles that generate short-living passwords, each of
which can only be used to access the system exactly once.
Communication between endpoints and the clients is se-
cured with Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL). Auto-
mated penetration-tests have been performed and did not
detect any weaknesses. Master data is stored encrypted in
the according backend. Accountability and integrity are
ensured by an audit trail that keeps protocol of every data
modification on each backend. We use virtual servers to
provide fail-over mechanisms. All endpoints are secured
by firewalls. Encrypted backups are created daily and
transferred to one dedicated location per backend. Both
systems were designed and implemented at our institution
in close collaboration with the involved physicians and re-
searchers using an agile development process with short
feedback cycles.
Both systems provide web-based data entry, support of
cross-validation and plausibility checks, a (logical) central
database, an elaborated security concept with multi-tier
pseudonymity for patient-, specimen- and image-identifiers.
A web-browser is the only software needed to access the
system. The informed consent serves as basic agreement
for the patient’s research participation. The systems use
controlled vocabularies [60] as well as standardized
questionnaires [61–63]. Access roles comprise application
administrators, monitors, physicians and lab personnel.
Each role has different permissions in terms of create-,
read-, update- and delete operations (CRUD) for certain
types of documents and system objects. Application ad-
ministrators are able to perform all CRUD-operations on
user accounts but do not have access to any type of re-
search data. Monitors may perform read-only operations
on clinical data to perform quality assurance. Physicians
may perform all CRUD-operations on master data and
clinical data. Each physician and patient is associated to
his or her home institution. Physicians are only able to ac-
cess data from patients related to the same institution.
An example screenshot of the EDC system implemented
for the TIRCON project is shown in Fig. 8. Here, a seam-
less integration of data from different pools is imple-
mented, providing the “create, list & delete” functionality
defined previously. The view shows an overview and sum-
mary data about all subjects, which can be managed by
the current user. For each subject, the list is substructured
into master data used for re-identification and an overview
of the documents used to track biosamples and to collect
clinical data. The view is realized with JSONP.
A second screenshot from the TIRCON application is
presented in Fig. 9. It shows an integrated view of mas-
ter data and clinical data from an eCRF realized with a
HTML-Frameset, which is provided by the primary service.
The view implements the previously defined functionality
of view & update. A top-frame displays the master data of a
select subject, whereas the bottom-frame shows the associ-
ated documents with clinical data, which are stored at the
secondary service. The bottom-frame is organized into two
interlinked regions. Firstly a document tree provides an
overview of the different documents available for the
subject. Secondly, the currently selected document from
the tree is displayed.
Discussion
Principal results
In this article, we have presented an overview of chal-
lenges and solutions for implementing software for the
management of pseudonymized data with web technolo-
gies. We have described a generic solution that can be
tailored to different pseudonymization schemes by using
a well-defined subset of the presented techniques. Our
approach is independent of the actual distribution of
data and it is able to manage associations between pa-
tients or visits and further external entities. The aim of
our implementation is to build integrated applications,
in which the actual distribution of data is transparent to
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users, providing a virtual central database. Our solution
features single-sign-on, supports multi-tier pseudonymity
and does not require direct server-to-server communica-
tion. By providing various features, our generic solution can
be used for the collection of a broad spectrum of different
types of data in compliance with national and international
laws. Moreover, as a basis, we chose a set of techniques that
are supported by modern state-of-the-art browsers as well
as legacy browsers. We have shown the practical applicabil-
ity of our approach, by using it as a basis for implementing
two geographically large research networks. Both systems
have been in productive use for several years. Several
Fig. 8 Annotated screenshot of the dashboard of the TIRCON registry. The screenshot shows data about patients included in the registry. The
view combines master data with specimen registration data and clinical data. It is realized with JSONP
Fig. 9 Annotated screenshot of an eCRF implemented in the TIRCON registry. For a selected patient it combines master data with an overview of
available documentation and a selected electronic document. The view is realized with HTML-Framesets
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national and international Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) and Data Protection Commissioners of the par-
ticipating sites have approved the concept.
Limitations
Current access statistics (i.e. from August 2015) for our
applications show that about 25 % percent of our users
still access the systems with legacy browsers, such as
Internet Explorer 8. As a consequence, we decided to
implement our approach with technologies that are sup-
ported in older versions of widespread web browsers
and did not utilize modern HTML 5 features, such as
CORS, or client-side frameworks for building Single-
Page Applications, such as AngularJS. Compared to the
technologies currently utilized in our implementations,
these methods have a great potential to reduce system
complexity. The main reason is that instead of distribut-
ing business logic over several backend servers, more
functionality can be bundled into the client application,
reducing the need for logic that orchestrates distributed
operations. Moreover, application development and system
maintenance are simplified, because the complexity of the
backend services can be reduced to a minimum. As support
for modern HTML features increases, we plan to upgrade
our solution from a tightly coupled application with server-
side rendering to a single-page application.
From a security and privacy perspective, current pseu-
donymization concepts are limited by not being based
on risk and threat analyses. This may be the reason why
multiple schemes have been proposed but international
consensus is missing. Overviews have been provided by
[64, 65]; the schemes described differ in their require-
ments on application level as well as on data level. Some
of these differences can be explained with the fact that
the schemes have been developed for different use cases
(e.g. for data warehouses [66] as compared to research
networks [20]). But still, many of the inherent design
decisions seem to be ad-hoc and lack thorough justifi-
cation, which could have been provided by a risk and
threat analysis. Some requirements can be well justified
with general principles in IT security, e.g., the need-to-
know principle and the principle of least privilege. Other
methods specified by pseudonymization concepts, how-
ever, have a strong impact on system design but lack such
justification. Among the important open questions are
motivations for the application-level requirements R-A2
(client-side re-combination only) and R-A3 (confidentiality
of internal identifiers) as well as the data-layer require-
ment R-D3 (two-tier pseudonymization).
The general problem is that it remains unclear, how
exactly data is to be separated into subsets. The ad-hoc
classification into “identifying data” and “other types of
data” is insufficient. For example, it is well understood
that data which may fall into the second category can be
used to re-identify individuals (see [67] for a discussion
regarding diagnosis codes). To the best of our know-
ledge, ISO 25237 [19] is the only work in the context of
pseudonymization that lists a set of common identifiers
with a high risk of re-identification. But still, no counter-
measures against this inherent problem of pseudonymity
have been proposed. This situation makes it difficult to
find an adequate balance between privacy concerns and
support for workflows that require re-identification of
data and subjects. For example, the pseudonymization
and de-pseudonymization process may be designed dif-
ferently. The work by Aamot et al. [64] suggests an effi-
cient routine process that requires to contact multiple
ombudsmen, each of which controls a horizontal subset
(i.e. data about a certain set of patients) of the data, to
de-pseudonymize datasets. In contrast, the concept of
Pommerening et al. [20] involves two additional parties
in the process of de-pseudonymizing research data, each
of which controls a vertical subset of the data (i.e. a cer-
tain set of attributes for all patients).
Threats and countermeasures
As already noted, a thorough risk and threat analysis is
needed to determine to which extent pseudonymity and
related methods, such as multi-tier pseudonymity or
client-side re-combination of data, offer protection against
common security threats at which costs. This in turn re-
quires an analysis of potential attack vectors, risks associ-
ated with common types of data, methods for quantifying
re-identification risks, and a consideration of results from
related research areas, such as privacy-preserving data
publishing or privacy-preserving data outsourcing. An
analysis of this kind would exceed the scope of this article.
In this article, we do not focus on the methodical basis of
pseudonymity, but on its implementation. Analogously to
related work [31, 64], we will therefore simply assume that
implementing pseudonymity as currently conceptualized
offers protection against information disclosure. In the
remainder of this section, we will focus on the specific
aspects of our implementation and the deployed systems.
The STRIDE [68] methodology provides an appropriate
means to analyze threats and countermeasures systematic-
ally. STRIDE is an acronym for the security threat types
addressed by the methodology which are (1) spoofing, (2)
tampering, (3) repudiation, (4) information disclosure, (5)
denial-of-service, and (6) elevation-of-privilege. We will re-
late these principles to the basic security principles of ISO
27000 [69] and RFC-4949 [70]:
1. “Authenticity – property that an entity is what it
claims to be” [69]
2. “Integrity – property of protecting the accuracy and
completeness of assets” [69]
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3. “Accountability – responsibility of an entity for its
actions and decisions” [69]
4. “Confidentiality – property that information is not
made available or disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities, or processes” [69]
5. “Availability – property of being accessible and
usable upon demand by an authorized entity” [69]
6. “Authorization – approval that is granted to a
system entity to access a system resource” [70]
The relation of security principles, threats and imple-
mented countermeasures can be seen in Table 1. Many
of the countermeasures deployed and implemented in
our systems are well-known and in widespread use. First,
we apply hardware-level protection, including restricted
access to hardware, secure server rooms with a UPS,
and redundant server hardware. Second, we implement
network-level measures, such as communication based
on TLS with certificates and IP-based filtering of requests.
On the host-level, we perform backups and maintain dis-
aster recovery plans, deploy intrusion detection systems,
firewalls, virus scanners, perform penetration testing
and server hardening and use virtualization as well as
automated server updates. On the application-level, our
software uses common methods, such as limits for login
attempts, automated logout after a certain time period,
two-factor authentication, role-based access control, input
sanitization (e.g. against SQL injection) and input valid-
ation. Additionally, our software implements various
pseudonymization methods, as described previously. On
the client-level, we employ account management policies
and perform user trainings.
Additionally, there are some more-specific security
measures implemented by our system. We have covered
many of them in the previous sections: prevention of re-
play attacks on the token infrastructure (one-time access
tokens), distributed non-delegated authentication where
each component handles authentication and authorization
autonomously (distributed authorization), an audit trail
that keeps protocol of every data modification on each
backend (audit trail) and the encryption of master data in
the according backend (database encryption). Additionally,
users from a specific participating site are only allowed to
access data of patients recruited at their site (site-based
view). This is implemented with the role-based access
control mechanism.
Comparison with related work
The work presented in this article is not the first solu-
tion that has been proposed for pseudonymized data
management. It is one of the very few contributions,
however, asking fundamental questions. We have pre-
sented a systematic solution for a typical use case, but
we strongly suggest further work. Moreover, we have put
emphasis on detailed descriptions of alternatives that are
available for implementing the methods described in this
paper.
There are many articles that focus on application-level
aspects of pseudonymization and do not describe technical
details about the information systems that manage these
data and implement the described processes [71–76]. Some
articles on pseudonymization focus on other use cases than
our work, leading to different functional requirements.
An important group consists of approaches in which
re-identification is only supported as an exceptional
procedure [66, 77, 78]. In any case, we consider risk and
threat analyses a must for the future. Furthermore, we did
not consider work in which access to pseudonymized data
is controlled by patients, e.g. via smart cards [79, 80].
Several articles have described systems that implement
loose coupling. For an in-depth comparison of loosely
coupled and tightly coupled architectures we refer to
Section “Architectural Options”, but we feel that the most
important drawback is that users may need to manually
Table 1 Common threats and countermeasures implemented by our systems
Security principle STRIDE threat Countermeasure (deployed)
Authenticity Spoofing (1) Non-delegated authentication, (2) TLS with server certificates, (3) Username/password policies,
(4) Two-factor authentication,(5) IP-based filtering of requests, (6) One-time access tokens to avoid
replay attacks, (7) Limit for login attempts, (8) Penetration testing, (9) Automatic logout after inactivity
Integrity Tampering (1) Server hardening, (2) Penetration testing, (3) Intrusion detection system, (4) TLS with server certificates,
(5) Software installation policies, (6) Audit trail, (7) Input validation, (8) Penetration testing
Accountability Repudiation (1) Auditing and logging
Confidentiality Information
disclosure
(1) Input validation, (2) TLS with server certificates, (3) Access restrictions to server hardware, (4) User training,
(5) Encrypted backups, (6) Intrusion detection system, (7) Two-tier pseudonymization, (8) Client-side
recombination of distributed data, (9) Encrypted tokens for communication between backends,
(10) Penetration testing, (11) Site-based view, (12) Database encryption
Availability Denial of service (1) Input validation, (2) IP-based filtering of requests, (3) Virtualization/sandboxing, (4) Redundant server
hardware/raid, (5) Backups/disaster recovery plan, (6) Automatic OS updates, (7) Firewalls and virus scanners,
(8) Intrusion detection system, (9) Secure server room including UPS and fire extinguisher
Authorization Elevation of
privilege
(1) Role-based Access Control (roles: physician, study nurse, monitor, researcher, lab personnel),
(2) Penetration testing, (3) User account management policies, (4) Distributed authorization
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transfer pseudonyms between component systems. The
work by Eggert et al. uses a paper-based core process in
which pseudonyms are printed on documents [36]. Physi-
cians use the pseudonym from the paper-based docu-
ments for remote entry of clinical data. Moreover, a
trusted third party is involved in the re-identification
process. Demiroglu et al. have published two articles
describing loosely coupled systems that implement one-
tier pseudonymity [31, 44]. Both systems manage links to
two external systems: Starlims [81], which is used for
managing biospecimen and secuTrial [82], which acts as a
clinical phenotype database.
The most elaborated approach for loose coupling has
been presented by Lablans et al. in [26]. Their work
describes a reference implementation of a REST-based
interface for the realization of clinical research networks.
Its main functionality is to support identity management,
i.e., to store master data together with an associated pseu-
donymized link (e.g. identifier) to an external data pool. In
the article, the EDC system secuTrial [82] is used as an ex-
ample. Analogously to our approach, the authors utilize to-
kens for the communication between the clients and the
RESTful backend but these tokens are not cryptographically
protected. In contrast to our solution their system only
supports one-tier pseudonymization and makes internal
pseudonyms (used for storage) visible to users.
The work by Brinkmann et al. [24] is an implementa-
tion of the model by Pommerening et al. The system
provides an integrated view on data from two separated
pools in a web browser. It employs IFrames for a tight
coupling of one-tier pseudonymized master data and
DICOM images. Temporary identifiers are utilized to inte-
grate these data without making pseudonyms visible to cli-
ents. While these design decisions and implementation
methods are similar to our solution, it is much narrower in
its scope. The system focusses on associating a collection of
images with patient master data, which is a rather simple
setup with a data model that is not too complex. The sys-
tem only uses IFrames for providing an integrated view on
distributed data. As we have described in Section 2.4.1,
IFrames are well suited for simple data structures, but have
technological limitations when dealing with more complex
data. We have also verified this with experiments. It
can therefore be assumed that the system is not able to
efficiently provide comprehensive views on complex
structures consisting of multiple different entities that
are interlinked with high multiplicities. Moreover, the
system provides a smaller set of features than ours. Im-
portant examples include not supporting multi-tier
pseudonymity and not providing alternatives to direct
server-to-server communication for the synchronization
of temporary identifiers.
Spitzer et al. [25] extend this work by utilizing JSONP
to overcome these limitations. The resulting client-side
JavaScript library has been published as DSLib [83]. This
library is used by the project Open Source Registry Sys-
tem for Rare Diseases in the EU (OSSE) for seamlessly
integrating two data pools [84, 85]. Moreover, the system
uses the identity management component by Lablans
et al. [26]. The system provides tight coupling of this
component with a newly developed EDC system for clin-
ical data. All of these solutions do not support two-tier
pseudonymity. Moreover, they focus on integrating master
data with clinical phenotype data, whereas our solution is
more generic. In our research networks we integrate
various types of complex data in several different views
(of course, only if permitted and required).
The articles by Bialke et al. [32, 45] describes a loosely
coupled approach where generic software modules per-
form tasks like pseudonymization and record-linkage
for research data. The aim is to reduce implementation
efforts by providing components that implement stand-
ard functionalities necessary in disease registries. The
individual modules are hosted together by a Trusted
Third Party which provides the according services to
external parties. The proposed architecture supports
two-tier pseudonymization between master data and
clinical phenotype data. The paper [45] focusses mainly
on workflow aspects. Both articles do not address
presentation-layer integration and integrated user in-
terfaces. Furthermore, they do not discuss technical
options for implementation.
Conclusions
Pseudonymization models are very heterogeneous, already
on a conceptual level. Most importantly it remains unclear
how exactly data is to be separated into distributed subsets.
What is lacking is a thorough risk and threat analysis for
pseudonymization schemes, covering at least the data- and
the application level. Different architectural solutions exist
for managing a set of pseudonymized data subsets, each of
which has different properties in terms of usability, support
for functional requirements and software complexity. Add-
itionally, these architectures can be implemented with dif-
ferent technologies. In this article, we have analyzed this
broad spectrum of architectural options and implementa-
tion techniques and we have presented a solution that is
generic because it is independent of the actual distribution
of data and supports a large set of features. In the future,
we will investigate how using more modern HTML features
can help to reduce system complexity and thus simplify ap-
plication development as well as system maintenance.
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